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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of
Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and
employment.
In the inflation targeting system, from August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation rate near
the 3 per cent medium term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the
monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration
of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and
capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, the Bank
publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report presents the inflation
forecasts prepared by the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis, as well as the macroeconomic
developments underlying these forecast. The Report is published biannually, with partial updates to the forecasts also prepared
twice a year. The forecasts of the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis are based on certain
assumptions. Hence, in producing its forecasts, the Directorate assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of
economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial
Analysis under the general direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director. The project was managed by Mihály András Kovács,
Deputy Head of Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis, with the help of Zoltán Gyenes, Gergely Kiss and Barnabás Virág.
The Report was approved for publication by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor.
Primary contributors to this Report also include: Tamás Balás, Szilárd Benk, Péter Bauer, Zoltán Gyenes, Mihály Hoffmann,
Áron Horváth, Éva Kaponya, Gergely, Kiss, Norbert M. Kiss, András Komáromi, András Mihály Kovács, Zsolt Lovas, Ádám
Martonosi, Zsuzsa Munkácsi, Benedek, Nobilis, György Pulai, Róbert Szemere, Béla Szörfi, Barnabás Virág. Other
contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report include various staff members of the Monetary Strategy and Economic
Analysis and the Financial Analysis.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings on 
10 November and 24 November 2008. The projections and policy considerations, however, reflect the views of staff in the
Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary
Council or the MNB.
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The November projection was produced in a much more uncertain financial
and macroeconomic environment compared with previous years. Therefore,
we departed from the past practice of building the forecast around a central
estimate. The Report provides a range for each variable, defined on the basis
of two equal paths.
The distribution of risks around the range is even more difficult to quantify
than in the past, which we did not undertake to plot using the technique of
earlier Reports (a fan chart based on past forecast errors). Our aim is to provide
a broadly accurate picture of the likely direction of changes in the economy,
thereby helping economic agents to adjust to expected future developments.
Provided that the basic assumptions (the most important of which include an
exchange rate of EUR/HUF 260 and oil prices around USD 80 per barrel) hold
true, the projection in the Report is that inflation will fall rapidly over the
forecast horizon. Accordingly, consumer price inflation is likely to amount to
slightly above 3 per cent in 2009 and below 2 per cent in 2010. Over the
forecast period, economic growth declines temporarily, followed by a very
slow recovery.
There are three major factors behind the significant difference compared to the
previous forecast for economic activity. First, there has been marked
deterioration in the outlook for growth in Hungary’s main export markets in
recent months. Second, in our view, domestic banks’ lending activity is likely
to contract much more sharply than assumed in August. And finally, the
government measures aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit are also expected to
contribute to a temporary decline in GDP growth.
In the current projection, inflation falls sharply as the prospects for the real
economy deteriorate and domestic absorption tapers off. The fiscal deficit and
the external financing requirement of the economy both may fall further in the
current adverse economic environment.
Hungary’s economic activity picked up steadily towards the middle of 2008,
fuelled by increases in government consumption and in-kind benefits, in
addition to household consumption expenditure, as well as by the outstanding
performance registered in the field of agriculture. Performance then clearly
worsened from the third quarter, as the general deterioration in the global
economic environment was gradually reflected in economic data.
Despite the adverse economic conditions, domestic wage growth dropped back
only slowly in Q3, with significant sectoral differences. Wage inflation fell
sharply in manufacturing, which has been hit by the marked deterioration in
the external business environment. By contrast, wage inflation did not
moderate in the services sector, where the effects of the increase in the
minimum wage for skilled workers were strongest. Taking into account the fact
that productivity growth has also slowed, inflationary pressure from the labour
market eased only to a negligible degree and thus remained elevated
throughout the period.
The uncertainty surrounding Hungary’s
macroeconomic prospects is orders of
magnitude greater than in the past
Rapid disinflation, temporary decline in
economic performance
The pick-up in domestic economic
activity has already stopped
Inflationary pressure from the labour
market has not diminished
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Summary
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 20088
In 2008 Q3, imported inflationary pressure in the domestic economy
diminished significantly, due to the appreciation of the forint to historical highs
against the euro, along with a decline in international commodity prices.
This decline in imported price inflation was also reflected in producer and
consumer prices: there was a significant slowdown in the rate of increase in
consumer prices of food as well as of industrial goods. In addition, service
sector firms were unable to fully pass higher costs through to their prices.
These factors have acted in combination to cause a significant fall in consumer
price inflation in recent months.
The global economic environment has changed significantly since August. 
A number of large financial institutions in developed countries have reported
much greater-than-expected losses in recent months, as a result of which they
have had to receive major injections of capital from governments, in addition
to the liquidity support provided earlier. All of this has led to a broader loss of
confidence amongst financial market participants, triggering a decline in risk
appetite and severe operational disruptions in the financial markets. In addition
to a panicked sell-off, the pronounced deterioration in the outlook for global
economic activity has also contributed to the steep declines on the capital
markets. According to the latest forecasts, the majority of developed economies
are facing either a temporary or a more prolonged economic recession. But the
deterioration in economic prospects has also brought about a correction in
commodity markets, with a sharp decline in oil prices since they reached their
peak in July.
The financial crisis is likely to lead to sustained decline in the assets-to-capital
ratio of financial institutions. De-leveraging may also occur through a sharp
cut-back in lending activity. This may be more evident in Hungary than the
general trend for Europe, as foreign currency-denominated loans account for
the larger part of new loans extended recently, and the financial sector in
Hungary can only access foreign currency funding at much tighter conditions,
compared with euro area countries and earlier periods.
The 2009 draft budget envisages a significant reduction in government
expenditures, amounting to close to 2 percentage points of GDP. The
reduction mainly affects spending on public sector wages, expenditures of
government units and financial transfers to households. The reduction in
expenditures will facilitate a more rapid decline in the 2008-2009 fiscal deficit
than previously targeted, but the trend is unlikely to continue into 2010,
assessing the aggregate impact of the currently known measures.
In addition to the reduction in the general government deficit, household
savings may increase substantially, due to tighter credit standards. Reflecting
these factors, Hungary’s external financing requirement is likely to fall further,
despite a deterioration in corporate profitability.
In the current projection, economic growth recedes temporarily, due to a
decline in the export markets, tightening credit condition and fiscal adjustment.
The anticipated recession in Europe is likely to drag down Hungarian export
growth to a significant degree. Weaker lending activity is expected to make it
harder for firms and households to finance investment and consumption.
A fall in imported inflationary pressure
and weak demand have led to a
slowdown in consumer price inflation
Escalation of the financial crisis has
caused a radical change in the outlook
for global real economic prospects
Declining budget and external deficit
Economic growth is likely to fall back
temporarily, followed by a tentative
recovery
Looking ahead, bank lending growth is
expected to fall sharply
SUMMARY
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Finally, the measures drawn up in the 2009 draft budget may restrain aggregate
demand, both directly and via a reduction in transfers to households.
The above factors will likely lead to a decline in household consumption and
investment activity in 2009, accompanied by a substantial improvement in the
sector’s propensity to save. Deteriorating prospects for economic activity and
declining net borrowing are expected to constrain corporate investment as
well. Nevertheless, a few major one-off factors may slow the general decline in
activity. Import growth is likely to slow sharply, driven by the fall in domestic
absorption. As a result, the contribution of net trade to GDP growth may be
positive, despite the significant deceleration in exports.
Weaker economic activity is expected to be associated with a sharp reduction
in employment and a significant moderation in private sector wage growth. On
the forecast horizon, one key question is the corporate sector’s ability to adjust
quickly and flexibly to the decline in productivity by restraining wage growth,
given the poor outlook for economic activity. The more flexible the adjustment
of wages is, the less likely it is that employment will fall back.
Provided that the basic assumptions hold true, inflation may fall rapidly in the
next quarters. While adverse global economic conditions may reduce imported
inflationary pressure, service sector price inflation may fall significantly,
reflecting the weakening in domestic economic activity. As a result of these
factors inflation may be slightly above 3 per cent in 2009 and below 2 per cent
in 2010.
Inflation is projected to fall rapidly
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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(The forecasts are conditional: they represent the scenarios, valid only if all of the assumptions presented in Chapter 3
materialise; unless otherwise indicated, it represents percentage changes on the previous year.)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.4 6.0 5.2 2.7–3.0 1.3–1.8
CPI 3.9 8.0 6.2 3.1–3.4 1.5–1.9
Economic Growth*
External demand (GDP-based) 3.9 3.8 2.3 (–0.4)–0.3 (–0.2)–1.5
Fiscal impact on demand2 0.4 –3.6 –1.9 (–0.6)–(–0.1) (–0.5)–0.3
Household consumption expenditure 1.9 0.7 0.4–0.5 (–3.6)–(–1.1) 0.4–1.2
Gross fixed capital formation –6.2 1.5 (–0.9)–(–0.5) (–3.5)–1.1 (–0.2)–2.8
Domestic absorption 1.8 –1.0 1.2 (–2.7)–(–0.4) 0.2–1.2
Exports 18.6 15.9 6.2–6.4 0.0–1.6 2.0–5.8
Imports3 14.8 13.1 6.6–6.7 (–1.2)–1.5 1.8–4.9
GDP** 4.1 1.1 1.0–1.1 (–1.7)–(–0.2) 0.5–2.0
Current account deficit3
As a percentage of GDP 7.5 6.4 7.0–7.2 4.0–4.9 4.3–4.4
In EUR billions 6.8 6.5 7.7–7.8 4.3–5.4 4.8–4.9
External financing requirement3
As a percentage of GDP 6.9 5.3 5.7–5.8 1.8–2.8 1.7–1.8
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.2 8.0 8.7 0.9–1.4 4.4–5.6
Whole-economy employment5 0.7 –0.1 –1.2 (–1.3)–(–0.9) (–1.8)–(–0.8)
Private sector gross average earnings6 9.4 (8.1) 9.1 (8.2) 9.3 (8.5) 5.0–5.7 4.3–5.5
Private sector employment5 1.2 0.9 –1.1 (–1.4)–(–0.9) (–2.2)–(–1.0)
Unit labour costs in the private sector5,7 4.4 7.3 4.6 4.7–4.8 2.0–2.8
Household real income*** –0.7 –3.0 0.8 (–1.6)–(–0.5) 1.1–1.7
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the long term, however, it follows a similar
trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value represents a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
Due to the high level of Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) the current account deficit/external financing requirement for the 2004-2007 period, may
be higher than suggested by official figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5
According to the CSO LFS data. 
6
According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
7
Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage index excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
* The CSO revised the national accounts data in October. We publish these revised data for the annual actual figures in the summary table. However,
as the quarterly profile is not yet available, we have used the previous data release in the projections. 
** Figures refer to the calendar-year adjusted data.
*** MNB estimate.
Summary of projections
1  Evaluation of the available 
macro-economic information

Since the middle of 2007, the global economic environment
has gradually become increasingly bleak. Since September this
process has accelerated, mainly due to negative news from the
banking sector and the financial markets.
1
While developments
in the real economy only follow the developments on the
financial markets with a certain degree of lag, the real
economic indicators for Europe for the last two quarters
already reflect substantial deterioration in business conditions.
Euro area output declined in the second and third quarters on
a quarterly basis, in an unprecedented development for the
euro area. The global slowdown in economic activity resulted
in weaker output across the Eastern European region as well,
while Hungary reacted most sensitively to the deteriorating
business cycle conditions in the region. Along with the
different domestic cycle, weaker Hungarian industrial export
production also played role in this performance.
According to the confidence indicators available to date for
the fourth quarter of 2008, economic activity has continued
to decline across the euro area. The German IFO index
suggests that economic participants expect an even poorer
short-term economic environment than was observed during
the European recession in 2001-2002.
Global commodity prices have also declined due to a
combination of the global economic slowdown, worsening
economic expectations, the general wave of selling on the
financial markets, and last but not least the better yield in
agricultural production compared to the previous year. In
USD terms, commodity prices have dropped by about 40 per
cent from their peaks in July to October, while the price of
food and oil products has fallen by 25 per cent and 45 per
cent, respectively.
2
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1.1  Deteriorating global economic environment
1 Financial market developments are addressed in detail in Section 2.
2 In EUR terms, the price decrease was less substantial, as the appreciation of the US dollar against the euro amounted to nearly 15 percent in the same period.
Chart 1-1
International economic activity (GDP)
Source: Eurostat.
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Chart 1-2
Global commodity prices*
* Denominated in USD. The commodity index is the weighted average of
the food, crude oil and metal product groups.
Source: IMF.
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Despite the deteriorating global business environment,
Hungarian economic growth data until the second quarter of
2008 reflected a moderate upturn. This upswing, however,
was largely due to temporary factors, while the developments
influencing the longer-term outlook indicated a more
negative picture. Within the economic sectors, agricultural
output contributed most strongly to growth, primarily due to
crop yields that significantly exceeded historical averages.
The value added of government-related services also slightly
surpassed the level observed in the previous year, primarily
owing to a better base effect in the wake of last year’s
deterioration. In addition, industrial value added increased
substantially, although waning momentum was already
apparent in the monthly indices for industrial production. At
the same time, weakening was observed in sectors more
closely linked to domestic economic processes. The gradual
decline in construction industry output started as early as the
beginning of 2007. Remarkably enough, the added value of
market services stagnated as well, a phenomenon which had
not been seen since 1995.
3
The positive development of temporary factors is evident in
the consumption structure of domestic economic growth in
the second quarter. The most significant growth affected
inventories, mainly due to the upsurge in agricultural output.
In addition, household consumption expenses continued to
grow moderately, partly on account of the borrowing boom
of households which lasted until September, and partly due
to growth in households’ disposable income in the first half
of the year, which once again exceeded inflation. On the
other hand, the structure of consumption growth is uneven.
Retail sales continued to fall relative to consumption
expenditure, suggesting that households mainly curtailed
their spending on durable goods in the period under review.
4
After a period of one and a half years, the contribution of the
general government’s consumption expenses was positive
once again, due primarily to an increased use of medical
services, which was probably a temporary factor. By contrast,
net export growth decreased significantly resulting from the
combined effect of a modest uptick in domestic consumption
and sagging external demand.
In addition to the aforementioned, growth in gross fixed
capital formation also decelerated, albeit the picture is rather
diverse across the different sectors. Investments in the private
sector grew vigorously, which is particularly apparent after
the exclusion of the high base effect of the extremely high
rubber industry investment in the previous year. At the same
time, this implied a boost in machine industry investments.
By contrast, household and government investments
declined, which in turn resulted in a decrease in construction-
type investments.
According to the preliminary release, annual GDP growth
stalled in 2008 Q3, and moreover, it fell slightly compared
with the previous quarter. Although detailed figures are not
yet available, the monthly indicators suggest that the
weakness of the industrial sector may have been an
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 200814
1.2  Hungarian economic activity rebounds
briefly, then weakens
Chart 1-3
Contribution of the output of main national
economic sectors to GDP growth*
* Considering that time series with chain-type indices are not additive,
aggregation errors were distributed between the individual items according
to their weight. While dynamics calculated from the resulting adjusted
time series are less reliable from a quantitative perspective (as they differ
from the original data), the chart still accurately reflects prevailing trends.
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3 Slowing growth rates have not generally tended to characterise market services. The most dramatic slowdown was observed in the sectors of financial activities, real
estate and other economic services, which can be fundamentally attributed to the global financial crisis and to waning growth in house construction.
4 As opposed to the index measuring the consumption expenses of households, statistical data of retail sales do not include purchases of services. Therefore, if the
growth of consumption expenditure surpasses retail sale growth, we may assume that the share of durable goods in total consumption has decreased compared to
services.
important factor explaining this decline in performance.
However, other sectors, which for various reasons are
strongly sensitive to the financial crisis, such as
construction, finance as well as retail and wholesale trade,
may also have contributed.
The continued decline in European industrial activity was
very quickly reflected in the production figures of the
Hungarian industrial export sector deeply integrated into the
EU economy. Hungary responded more sensitively to the
deterioration in the external environment than most of the
other CEE countries, in which country-specific factors may
have also played a role. One such factor may have been the
forint strengthening to a historical peak in Q3. As currencies
across the region appreciated in nominal terms up to
September, movements in the exchange rate may only
explain the economy’s poor performance if there is evidence
that the domestic industry has responded more sensitively to
the exchange rate shock than elsewhere in the region.
However, the more likely explanation is that capacity
problems, discussed in previous Reports, and other
competitiveness factors may have been in the background of
weak performance.
5
Another important factor contributing to the change in the
macroeconomic environment may have been the direct
involvement of the domestic financial sector in the crisis. In
addition, although lending activity had continued to be
strong up to the third quarter, the simultaneous deterioration
in the outlook for growth and incomes may have prompted
economic agents mainly to hold back on large expenditures.
This tendency was reflected primarily in the declines in
construction output and retails sales of consumer durable
goods, according to monthly data.
EVALUATION OF THE AVAILABLE MACRO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION
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Chart 1-4
Annual growth in main consumption items of GDP
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Chart 1-5
Industrial production in the region and the euro
area*
(Seasonally adjusted data)
* Source: Eurostat, CSO; adjusted by MNB
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5 As noted in previous Reports, Hungarian export prices had been very uncompetitive in past years compared with other countries of the CEE region; and investment
activity in manufacturing appeared to have been subdued. These factors, coupled with the shortage of skilled labour, may be placed at a competitive disadvantage
compared with other countries of the region.
According to the data released since the publication of August
Report, the gradual decline in private sector wages, which
started at the beginning of the year, continued. It is
noteworthy, however, that only the manufacturing industry
is affected by this decline in wages; as wage dynamics in the
sectors of market services remained at the formerly observed
high levels.
According to our analysis, changes in the wage index of
companies with more than 250 employees reflect the long-
term trends prevailing across the private sector fairly well.
The wage decline that started at the beginning of the year
continued in the last quarter in this part of the corporate
sector, both with respect to regular wages and gross average
earnings.
According to the labour force survey conducted by the CSO,
the number of employees in the private sector increased by
around 25,000 in Q3. As these data stand in contrast to
developments in the macroeconomic environment, this rise
in employment is only expected to be temporary. This
assumption is confirmed by the fact that this growth –
measured between May and July based on a monthly
frequency – already lapsed into stagnation during the last two
months. In the meantime, the dynamics of labour market
activity have surpassed growth in employment, and as a net
result, the unemployment rate continued to rise to around 8
per cent.
In overall annual terms, the decline in average labour costs
was not as strong as the decline in productivity in the
previous quarter, and thus nominal unit labour costs rose
again, with the result that inflationary pressure from the
labour market increased slightly.
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1.3  Gradually decreasing wages, contradictory
employment data
Chart 1-6
Gross average earnings in the private sector*
* Yearly index, data adjusted seasonally for whitening and the changed
seasonality of bonuses.
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Chart 1-7
Development of wages at companies with over 
250 employees*
* Annual index, based on uncorrected data which has not been adjusted for
seasonal effects.
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Chart 1-8
Number of employees in the national economy
Source: Labor Force Survey.
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According to the annual indices, the consumer price index
and core inflation dropped to 6.3 per cent and 5.6 per
cent, respectively, in the third quarter of 2008. This
occurred despite rising inflation in the EU: hence the level
of Hungarian inflation moved closer to the European
average.
Disinflationary trends are also underlined by indices showing
quarterly changes. Our analyses indicate that the index best
capturing inflationary trends dropped to 4 per cent.
6
This
disinflationary trend is found in a wide range of products and
services. During the third quarter, the disinflation process
accelerated, and in September and October it was
exceptionally strong.
Several factors contributed to this decline in inflation, and
amongst these factors the turnaround in commodity prices
may have had the greatest impact. In respect of commodity
prices, decreasing agricultural commodity prices have been
particularly strong disinflationary factors in certain regions,
including Hungary. Domestic prices of unprocessed foods
have already been declining for half a year, but the
disinflationary trend in processed food prices was very
gradual until September. Since then, a marked downturn in
prices has been observed.
Until recently, the forint was characterised by a historically
strong exchange rate, which supported disinflation,
particularly in the case of tradable goods. On the whole,
prices in this product category did not increase in the third
quarter, whereas in September and October prices started to
increase again due to the weakening of the HUF.
Slack demand at domestic levels may have been an additional
factor facilitating the disinflationary trend. According to our
analyses, this factor may have strongly contributed to the fact
that there was no further increase in inflation in market
services in the third quarter, despite the preceding increase in
energy and food prices. In fact, there was a slight decline in
the level of inflation. It is worth noting that the decline in
inflation accelerated during the quarter, and – disregarding
one-off distorting effects – by September inflation had
dropped to 4 per cent from the previous level 6 per cent.
7
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1.4  Disinflation continues
Chart 1-9
Inflation developments
(Annual change)
Source: Eurostat.
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Chart 1-10
Changes in the individual components of inflation*
(Annualised quarterly change)
* The trend inflation index excludes the effects of indirect tax changes in
tradables, processed foods and market services.
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6 The trend inflation index excludes the effects of indirect tax changes in tradables, processed foods and market services.
7 In September, education services became cheaper, as the number of university students financed by the state increased relative to the number of students financing
their own education. If we had not excluded this one-off effect from the data, the annualised monthly inflation of market services would have been 2 per cent for
September.
Despite falling inflation, the inflation perception and
inflation expectations of households did not weaken. This
indicates that the risks associated with inflation expectations
are still present in the Hungarian economy. One possible
reason for this phenomenon could be that the disinflationary
trend observed in the past one and a half years was not
drastic enough to substantially modify households’
perception of inflation. It is also possible that general
negative sentiment about the economic situation and the
economic outlook explain the high levels of inflation
perception/expectations. Nevertheless, the experiences of
several countries suggest that in many cases the inflation-
related attitude of households do not lead the changes in
inflation, but rather lag behind them.
8
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Chart 1-11
Inflation perception and expectations of households
Source: Median survey.
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8 See for example Bakshi-Yates (1998): “Are UK Inflation Expectations Rational”, Bank of England Working Paper Series No. 81.
2  Financial markets and lending

During the recent months another bout of risk aversion
and loss of confidence – observed since the outbreak of the
sub-prime mortgage market crisis – took place. This
resulted in an additional, much more significant fall in the
price of risky assets. One new phenomenon is that, in order
to reduce leverage investors are striving to jettison assets
they perceive to be risky, irrespective of the price and the
magnitude of the losses realised. The developments are
characterised by strong uncertainty, which is also reflected
in the increased volatility seen in almost all markets.
A renewed decline in risk appetite occurred in September, as
a result of bad news on overseas financial institutions.
Despite its near-bankruptcy situation, at first Lehman
Brothers only received a liquidity injection from the Federal
Reserve, but did not receive a lifeline similar to the one
granted to Bear Stearns. This resulted in a strong erosion of
banks’ confidence in one another, as well as a further jump in
interbank market interest rate premiums and a fall in equity
market prices. Financial difficulties faced by other banks and
the largest American insurance company (AIG) also
contributed to the deterioration of the situation. Overall,
these events resulted in fundamental changes in the
functioning of the financial intermediary system. At end-
September, markets were temporarily calmed by the US
government initiative to offer a USD 700 billion rescue
package, but over the longer term this did not lead to a
turnaround in investor sentiment.
In parallel with the flight from risky assets, there was an
increase in demand for short-term US government securities,
which are considered to be the safest. As a result, the yield on
such instruments sank to nearly 0 per cent. Meanwhile, as a
consequence of banks’ lack of confidence, the interest rate on
interbank loans increased sharply, which resulted in an
unprecedented widening of the interest rate spread between
the two. The mounting lack of confidence passed through to
the European interbank market as well, where developments
similar to those overseas took place, although to a smaller
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2.1  Deteriorating global market sentiment,
more active central bank measures
Chart 2-1
Changes in risk indicators*
* Indicators reflecting spreads on EUR-denominated debt in a breakdown
by credit rating.
Source: J.P. Morgan.
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Chart 2-2
Fed’s interest rate target and 3-month USD
interbank and government security yields
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Chart 2-3
ECB’s policy rate and the 3-month EUR interbank
and government security yields
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extent; the spread between the interbank market yield and
the yield on German government securities expanded to a
historical peak here as well.
As time went by, in addition to the declining willingness to
take risks, fears of recession surrounding the US economy,
the developed European countries and the emerging market
countries which depend on these economies through foreign
trade (such as Hungary) started to increasingly dominate as
an underlying reason for falling equity indices. This trend is
confirmed not only by the profit projections of the largest
corporations, but also by a number of consumer and
corporate confidence surveys. Banks, research institutions
and supranational organisations revised their growth
projections significantly lower.
Large central banks attempted to reduce the pressure in the
interbank money markets by additional liquidity-boosting
measures. The Fed concluded agreements, first with the
largest central banks, and then with the central banks in some
emerging market countries as well, to provide dollar liquidity
for the banks of the given country. Both the Fed and the ECB
expanded the scope of securities eligible as collateral in
several steps, as well as first increasing, then providing
unlimited dollar and euro liquidity against collateral for
banks operating in the USA and the euro area, respectively.
From a certain point of view, central banks took over the role
of the interbank market. In addition, on 8 October, the
largest central banks reduced their interest rates in a
harmonised manner.
Governments also strived to forestall the crisis by taking
various steps. First, the news about the USD 700 billion
rescue package introduced in the USA (buying up the
troubled assets held by banks and capital allocation to
financial institutions), then the obligations undertaken by the
leaders of the largest European countries resulted in
temporary rebounds in the markets. In numerous countries,
the amount of deposit insurance was raised, certain bank
debts were guaranteed and banks’ capital was increased by
the state. Considering the deteriorating outlook for business
conditions, the governments of several countries also tried to
help companies with fiscal measures in order to reduce mass
layoffs.
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In 2008 H1, despite gloomy global market sentiment,
demand for the currencies and bonds of emerging market
countries did not decline (as seen in the appreciation of their
currencies and the decline in the risk premium of their
foreign exchange bonds, as opposed, for example, to the
developments in equity prices), but starting from September,
the radical deterioration in investors’ risk tolerance affected
price developments in emerging market assets to a great
degree as well.
The situation of European emerging market currencies was
rendered even more difficult by the currency crisis in Iceland,
which highlighted the risk of significant capital outflows
from countries struggling with major imbalances. Under these
circumstances, due to its high external and government debts
as well as its low growth, investors also considered Hungary
to be a vulnerable country, despite the fact that some of its
balance indicators (current account and state budget deficit)
have improved considerably in recent years. In this situation,
Hungary’s vulnerability was exacerbated by the developed
state of the domestic government securities market, as well as
the strong integration of the domestic banking sector with
the financial intermediary system of the euro area, which
facilitated the rapid sale of assets and withdrawal of capital.
In the span of two days in mid-October, the EUR/HUF
exchange rate increased from 265 to 282. There would have
been no fundamental reasons for further substantial
depreciation of the domestic currency, but presumably
speculative transactions also played a major role in the
weakening of the forint. Therefore, in order to make
speculation against the forint more expensive and to prevent
it, the central bank increased the base rate by 300 basis
points, and narrowed the interest rate corridor to ±50 basis
points. In parallel, the government initiated negotiations with
the International Monetary Fund and the European
Commission on setting up a credit line to ensure the foreign
exchange financing of the country, should it not be
completely feasible via the market due to a drying up of
foreign exchange sources. The EUR 20 billion credit line
reduced the country risk for investors, which – presumably
together with the increase in the base rate and the
improvement of the global market sentiment in the last days
of October – resulted in a remarkable strengthening of the
forint. Both in the periods of depreciation and appreciation,
the movements of the forint typically exceeded the increase
or decrease in the exchange rates of the other currencies in
the region.
Between early-September and mid-November, non-residents
sold almost HUF 1,900 billion in the foreign exchange
market, which, together with the large increase in their FX
swap holdings indicates that they took synthetic positions
expecting a significant depreciation of the forint and covered
the forint exchange rate exposure of their existing assets to
an increasing extent, instead of undertaking the exposure.
A similar trend was observed in the development of
Hungary’s CDS price. With the increase in risk aversion, the
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2.2  Flight from risky assets had a particularly
negative impact on Hungary
Chart 2-4
Exchange rates of currencies in the region*
* Changes in per cent, 1 May 2008=0, the positive value indicates the
depreciation of the local currency's exhange rate. 
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Chart 2-5
Developments in CDS spreads in some emerging
countries
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Hungarian CDS spread rose above 600 basis points (27
October) along with the spread of developing countries, but
to a greater extent than some of them. Following the
improvement in market sentiment and the announcement of
the credit line, there was a significant moderation and also an
improvement relative to other developing countries until
early November (to 290 basis points), and then the spread
started to rise again.
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The confidence crisis was reflected in the turmoil on the
domestic interbank forint and foreign exchange loan/deposit
markets as well. In accordance with international practice,
the MNB strived to provide additional liquidity to the
banking sector by expanding its instruments, and to facilitate
the redistribution of liquidity as an intermediary.
Although under normal market circumstances the primary
redistribution of liquidity is typically implemented in the
uncovered interbank forint market, this market was unable to
effectively perform this task in recent weeks. The inadequate
functioning of the interbank forint market and the lack of
interbank confidence and limits is reflected by the fact that
credit and deposit facilities are used simultaneously at the
MNB on the two edges of the interest rate corridor.
9
The
MNB attempted to facilitate banks’ access to forint liquidity
with two new forint lending instruments and government
securities auctions from 21 October and 17 October,
respectively.
Domestic interbank market problems were exacerbated by
the fact that in addition to the inadequate redistribution of
forint liquidity, banks faced the lack of foreign exchange
liquidity as well. As a result of the global liquidity shortage,
increased sovereign risk and the lack of confidence, some
domestic banks encountered difficulties in obtaining foreign
exchange. In order to solve this problem, in mid-October the
MNB introduced two-way O/N FX swap tenders, thereby
practically playing an intermediary role between banks with
euro surplus and those which are short of it, as they do not
engage in transactions with one another due to their reduced
limits. For those domestic financial institutions which cannot
obtain sufficient FX liquidity in the interbank market or
through the aforementioned MNB tenders, the MNB – also
in the form of FX swap transaction – provides euro liquidity,
received from the ECB on the basis of a EUR 5 billion
framework agreement. The FX swap instruments introduced
by the MNB contributed significantly to the fact that banks
which could not obtain enough foreign exchange on the swap
market were not compelled to buy foreign exchange on the
spot market, which would have resulted in depreciation of
the forint and the opening of banks’ foreign exchange
position (an increase in their exchange rate exposure).
The global decline in risk appetite was also reflected in non-
residents’ sales of government securities on the secondary
market. In October, non-residents sold government securities
worth approximately HUF 600 billion, which had not
happened in previous years. As a result of this selling
pressure, yields on government securities increased
considerably. The largest increase was observed in the 3-5
year segment of the curve, where yields have increased by
450 basis points since end-August. The yield spread
compared to interest rate swap yields and the bid-ask spreads
significantly exceeded the levels seen during the March
turbulence, which illustrates the strong functional disorders
and on some days an almost complete standstill of the bond
market. The MNB’s purchases of government securities
presumably contribute to normalisation of the functioning of
the secondary market.
Although there has been some improvement in the
functioning of the markets, the normal course of business has
not been restored. As a result of this disfunctionality,
inconsistent yield levels can be observed in some markets.
Deterioration of the information content of yields makes it
difficult to identify the path of the central bank base rate
expected by the market. However, the central bank measures
jointly facilitated the more effective orientation of the market
interest rate level.
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2.3  The MNB tried to overcome liquidity troubles
in the domestic markets by introducing new
instruments
9 Similar developments were observed in the case of the ECB regarding the use of instruments on the two sides.
The forward-looking real interest rate has increased
considerably in recent months. This is primarily the result of
an increase in the risk premium of the forint, the increase in
yields stemming from the selling pressure and the illiquidity
of the markets, as well as the subsequent 300 basis point
increase in the central bank base rate. The rise in the nominal
yield level did not entail an increase in expected inflation,
because, as a consequence of the deteriorating growth
prospects and the recent declines in energy prices, the
expected magnitude of price increases has declined, despite
the higher EUR/HUF exchange rate, which is reflected in the
forecasts of both the central bank and analysts.
Changes in the real exchange rate were primarily determined
by the developments in the nominal forint exchange rate,
which has been rather volatile in recent months. While the
forint appreciated significantly in real terms before end-
August, the global decline in risk appetite resulted in
considerable weakening of the forint until mid-October: the
EUR/HUF exchange rate increased from 230 to above 280.
This was followed by some correction at end-October, with
the forint appreciating back to the level of 255. As mentioned
earlier, a temporary improvement in global market
sentiment, the 300 basis point increase in the central bank
base rate and the credit facility set up for Hungary by the
International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the
World Bank may have all played a role in this strengthening.
However, the domestic currency then weakened again on the
back of international sentiment, which turned unfavourable
again, and downgrades of Hungary’s ratings. The overall
depreciation of the forint in nominal terms in the last quarter
was stronger than the inflation differential between Hungary
and the euro area which points to real appreciation, and this
resulted in a substantial depreciation in real terms.
With the deepening of the financial crisis, a significant
decline in the domestic credit supply took place, due to
increasing interest rates and quantity constraints. Several
banks recently tightened the price and non-price conditions
for lending. In addition, an increasing number of financial
institutions have decided to suspend their foreign exchange
based schemes, which were dominant in recent years. An
eventual expansion of more expensive forint loans may
result in further tightening of financial conditions. Overall,
the tighter credit conditions are not fully reflected by the
real exchange rate and the real interest rate, usually
considered relevant indicators of monetary conditions. As a
result of a decline in foreign exchange lending, the role of
the interest rate channel in general may strengthen in
monetary transmission.
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2.4  Despite substantial weakening of the forint,
monetary conditions did not loosen
Chart 2-6
Developments in monetary conditions
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Chart 2-7
Changes in the HUF/EUR exchange rate
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Although data available in September indicated a relatively
stable growth path, the negative events of October in both
the global and the domestic economic environment
profoundly changed economic participants’ access to credit.
We will first provide a brief overview of domestic banks
10
lending activities up to September, followed by a description
of the processes prevailing from October.
Growing demand for loans was observed in the third quarter
both the corporate and households sector, which boosted net
borrowings; thus the deceleration experienced in the second
quarter was followed by an adjustment. As a result of
accelerating lending dynamics, growth in corporate loans
surpassed the growth rate of nominal GDP once again, while
in the case of households this had already been the case.
Foreign exchange continues to make up a large slice of
lending, especially in terms of credit growth.
In the household segment, after foreign exchange loans
gained ground in 2004, net borrowings were consistently on
the rise until 2008, and then started to decline slightly.
Several explanations may account for this phenomenon: on
the one hand, as a result of the growing indebtedness of
households, the number of creditworthy customers may have
declined; on the other hand, indebtedness may have also
been behind the decreasing willingness of credit institutions
to grant loans. However, in our opinion the latter had a
smaller impact.
Another factor that may have contributed to the rebound in
credit demand in the third quarter is the fact that credit
institutions only partially passed the increased costs of
financing triggered by the sub-prime crisis on their
customers. We assume that market participants expected
soaring credit costs in the long run, so they partially brought
their borrowings ahead. As to the reason behind the partial
passing of costs, credit institutions may have preferred credit
rationing to incorporating the increased costs in their pricing,
therefore they tightened their credit standards and credit
conditions instead.
The negative developments during October in both the global
and domestic economic environment profoundly changed the
future prospects. Soaring financing costs can be explained by
several factors. Firstly, the parent banks of domestic banks
faced a significant widening of their CDS spreads. Secondly –
further intensifying the implications of the above – a
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2.5  Tighter lending conditions expected
Chart 2-8
Net borrowings of households*
* Annual growth (adjusted for exchange rate effects).
Source: MNB.
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Chart 2-9
Interest rate premium of household loans relative to
the 3-month base rate*
* APR – CHF LIBOR; 3-month moving average.
Source: MNB.
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10 Financial accounts data would be more suitable for describing the lending process in its entirety, but their availability is considerably delayed. Lacking such data, the
analysis focused on the lending information of the domestic banking sector. For households this does not imply a constraint, as the sector has no material borrowings
from foreign banks, however, domestic bank loans constitute only a half of the total borrowings of the corporate sector.
substantial increase in Hungarian sovereign CDS spreads also
occurred during the same period.
The third factor affecting financing costs is the drying up of
swap markets (USD-HUF, EUR-HUF, EUR-CHF), and their
growing implied financing costs. Since Hungarian banks
obtained a large part of the funds required for foreign
exchange lending through swap contracts, this factor plays a
decisive role. As banks – and most analysts – considered
renewal risks very low in the past, the maturity of swap
contracts was typically much shorter than the instruments
they financed. Banks face deteriorating profitability since the
renewal of swap positions has become more difficult, more
expensive or even impossible, while the widening foreign
exchange position puts upward pressure on exchange rate
risks. As liquidity risks grow, banks may attempt to reduce
maturity transformation by decreasing their long-term
lending, which leads to lower credit supply. The typically
pro-cyclical behaviour of banks also undermines the credit
opportunities of economic participants as banks – in order to
avoid the accumulation of losses through depreciation and to
protect their capital position in a deteriorating economic
environment – may resort to credit rationing: they may freeze
lending to debtors with worse credit ratings, or as a last
resort, might even suspend lending altogether.
As a result of the drastically changed environment, several
Hungarian commercial banks announced in October that due
to the spill-over effects of the sub-prime crisis and to the lack
of foreign exchange liquidity, they would limit or terminate
the disbursement of foreign exchange-based loans, and to
make up for the higher external costs of funds, they would
raise the interest rates payable by customers.
In the case of Swiss franc loans, which used to be the most
popular among households, nearly all banks terminated the
practice of extending them with preferential interest rates or
foregoing upfront charges. Of those that did not suspend
CHF lending altogether, several banks raised their interest
rates significantly, by 200-350 basis points. As the magnitude
of this interest raise substantially exceeds the growth of
financing costs, this action may in fact be the pricing out of
CHF-based products. This assumption is supported by the
fact that the interest rate increase for existing customers was
a mere fraction of the rates defined for new contracts. In
addition to the changes in pricing, banks severely tightened
their non-price related conditions as well. They discontinued
several existing products including only mortgage-based
lending; in mortgage lending they decreased the LTV ratio;
and they apply a higher discount for determining the
collateral value of real estate. Further weakening the supply
side, banks now accept only a limited number of new credit
applications through the broker distribution channel, whose
share amounted to around 50 per cent recently.
As noted above, the most probable overall result of the
supply side ‘credit crunch’ will be a significant fall in
household lending. We expect that credit rationing will play
an increasingly important role, while the predominantly
smaller banks that have not re-priced their loans thus far have
insufficient infrastructure to make up for the shrinking
lending opportunities provided by larger banks. Regarding
housing loans, state-subsidised forint loans may become
competitive again. The Hungarian public is extremely
sensitive to payment burdens, and a steep interest rate
increase is likely to inhibit the willingness of households to
borrow, putting downward pressure on demand, while the
average amount of loans may also shrink as the ratio of
instalments relative to income grows substantially. Moreover,
under conditions marked by increased exchange rate
volatility, households will be reluctant to become indebted in
foreign currency, but they will not be able to afford the
higher interest rates on forint loans.
Although a part of the October data already reflects the first
signs of substantial tightening in credit conditions, we expect
the November data to be more revealing, since data for
October also reflect the effects of earlier loan contracts.
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Chart 2-10
1-year and 5-year CDS spreads of domestic banks’
parent banks
Sources: Thomson Datastream, Bloomberg, Reuters.
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3  Inflation and real economic prospects

Our November forecast is markedly different from earlier
projections, in several respects.
11
The major shocks in recent
months not only change the expected macroeconomic path,
but also call for the introduction of a new methodology to
address the uncertainty surrounding the forecast as a result of
these shocks. Since our expectations regarding the economic
outlook have become significantly more uncertain, we have
suspended the practice of structuring our projections around
a preferred baseline scenario. At this time, our forecast
indicates a range for each variable, which was defined on the
basis of two equally ranked scenarios. The risk distribution
surrounding the range is even harder to quantify than before,
and thus we were not able to illustrate it by means of the
technology used in previous Reports (a fan chart based on
historical projection errors).
Before presenting our forecast in detail, we briefly describe
the two paths, and the differences between our
assumptions below. Above all, it is important to stress that
the basic assumptions we generally use for our projections
– base rate, EUR/HUF exchange rate, oil prices – are
exactly the same in both versions. We defined the two
scenarios on the basis of two main points of uncertainty.
On the one hand, we are uncertain about the longer-term
prospects for global economic activity. In the optimistic
scenario we predict a faster recovery from the slowdown
already emerging, expecting our trading partners to
gradually rebound from the middle of 2009. By contrast,
our pessimistic scenario expects a recession until 2010.
The second point of uncertainty concerns development in
domestic lending. In the optimistic scenario we project
merely a gradual slowing of lending dynamics, while the
pessimistic scenario is founded on the premise of a
dramatic decrease in the borrowing of both households and
the corporate sector.
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Chart 3-1
Risk distribution in the current and previous projections
Probability
Baseline
Fan chart
Probability
Two
scenarios
11 Our forecast is based on information available up to 5 p.m., 14 November 2008.
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In line with the previous practice of our Reports, our forecast applies
certain fixed, basic assumptions regarding the expected path of the
base rate, the EUR/HUF exchange rate and oil prices. We fixed the
central bank base rate at 11.5 per cent, which reflects the level to which
it was raised on 22 October. For the exchange rate, we used the average
October EUR/HUF exchange rate, which is around 11 per cent weaker
than the exchange rate applied in our previous forecast. Looking at
forward oil prices, we can observe a significant change as well, albeit in
the opposite direction. Denominated in euro, oil prices decreased by
25-30 per cent, depending on maturity. It should be noted that in
parallel with the decrease in spot oil prices in recent months, the curve
of the oil forward price path changed as well: as the price reduction was
smaller across longer maturities, the curve of the oil forward path
became steeper.
Box 3-1: Our basic assumptions
Table 3-1
Changes in our basic assumptions compared to the August Report*
August 2008 November 2008 Change compared with August
(per cent)
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Central bank base rate
(per cent)** 8.5 8.5 8.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
HUF/EUR 242.8 231.9 231.9 250.4 257.9 257.9 3.1 11.2 11.2
USD/EUR (cent) 155.4 157.7 157.7 147.5 133.5 133.5 -5.1 -15.4 -15.4
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 122.4 138.2 137.1 101.8 80.7 86.7 -16.9 -41.6 -36.8
Brent oil price (EUR/barrel) 78.1 87.6 87.0 68.1 60.4 64.9 -12.8 -31.1 -25.3
Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 18,974 20,324 20,167 17,052 15,584 16,751 -10.1 -23.3 -16.9
* Yearly averages, looking ahead on the basis of average exchange rates prevailing in October 2008, and the oil forward price path.
** End-of-year values based on our fixed interest base rate, changes compared to August are expressed in percentage points. 
In recent months, growth prospects have deteriorated
markedly for all components. While the first half of 2008 saw
a revival in economic activity, the third quarter showed a
decline on a quarterly basis. Looking ahead we expect a
further decline in GDP, but due to the low base from last year
the annual growth rates will show a decrease only early next
year. This may be followed by a moderate recovery in 2010,
although economic growth will remain subdued over the
entire forecast horizon.
On the whole, we expect GDP dynamics to fall significantly
below their potential growth rate over the entire forecast
horizon, and therefore, contrary to our previous
expectations, the negative output gap will continue to widen
continuously until 2010. Following the 1 per cent growth
this year, cumulated economic growth will remain under 2
per cent for the next two years, even according to our
optimistic scenario, while the pessimistic scenario predicts a
decline of around 1.5 per cent in 2009, followed by modest
growth of about 0.5 per cent in 2010.
Our outlook for economic growth has drastically changed
compared to the previous Report, for three main reasons.
First, our expectations regarding the path of external
economic activity are much more pessimistic than previously.
Second, aggregate demand is reduced substantially – by
nearly 2 per cent of the GDP – based on the new measures
defined in the Budget Act for 2009. Finally, in the wake of
the financial crisis, our expectations regarding the borrowing
opportunities of economic agents are much bleaker than
before.
In our forecast for external demand, we ascribed great weight
to the strong international slowdown seen in the last few
weeks. The global tensions on interbank markets and lending
are significant contributing factors behind this slowdown. In
contrast with the brisk growth observed in the first quarter of
the year in the euro area, the latest data and indices reflecting
short-term expectations portend a very gloomy outlook for
Hungary’s most important trading partner. In view of the
above, we projected a short-term stagnation of the GDP-
based external demand in both scenarios.
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3.1  Temporary economic deterioration followed
by slow recovery
Chart 3-2
Expected changes in the GDP*
* The edges of the illustrated bands indicate the two scenarios.
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* GDP-based external demand, values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the specified institutions for the relevant countries are adjusted with
the weighting system of the MNB, which is also used for the calculation of the bank’s own external demand indices. Therefore, these figures may deviate
from the figures published by the specified institutions.
Total Euro area
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
MNB November 2008 2.1 (-0.4) - 0.3 (-0.2)  - 1.5 1.2 (-0.8) - (-0.2) (-0.6) - 1.1
August 2008 2.5 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.7
IMF* November 2008 (update) 1.9 0.0 x 1.2 -0.5 x
October 2008 2.6 1.1 2.2 1.3 0.2 1.3
April 2008 2.2 1.9 2.8 1.4 1.2 2.1
OECD* June 2008 2.5 2.0 x 1.7 1.4 x
December 2008 2.6 2.5 x 1.9 2.0 x
EB* Autumn 2008 2.5 0.9 1.7 1.2 0.1 0.9
Spring 2008 2.6 2.3 x 1.8 1.6 x
EKB September 2008 x x x 1.1 - 1.7 0.6 - 1.8 x
June 2008 x x x 1.5 - 2.1 1.0 - 2.0 x
Table 3-2
Our external demand projections compared to forecasts of international institutions*
As noted above, the two scenarios differ with respect to long-
term prospects. In the first case, economic activity will start
to pick up from the second half of 2009 for our trading
partners; this scenario is broadly consistent with the forecasts
published by international institutions. On the other hand,
since all analyses focusing on European economic activity
indicate substantial downside risks in the projections, in our
second scenario we predicted that shrinking loan supply
would result in a sustained slowdown in European growth,
leading to a recession that would last until 2010.
Relative to both the double-digit growth rates seen in
previous years and our own earlier projections, growth in
exports drops off significantly in both scenarios. In contrast
with the 6 per cent rate projected for this year, export
dynamics are forecast to fall to the 0-2 per cent range next
year, and to the 2-6 per cent range by 2010. In both
scenarios, we predicted that growth in imports would fall
behind that of exports across the entire forecast horizon due
to slack domestic demand, and consequently the contribution
of net exports to growth is expected to be positive in 2009
and 2010.
Conditions for economic growth in Hungary are significantly
influenced by the effects of the government measures
included in the draft Budget Act for 2009, which were
announced at the end of October – these measures include
freezing nominal wages in the public sector, eliminating the
13th month salary, and tightening the regulations for the
13th month pension payment. With respect to these
government measures, we should note that we expect the
nominal wage freeze in the public sector to be sustained, and
by 2010 we project similar wage growth rates in the public
sector as in the private sector.
Tighter credit conditions are expected to restrain investment
activity by the corporate sector and households the most. The
tighter conditions will also have a significant impact on the
consumption expenditure of households. We cannot deny the
possibility that tighter credit will make the financing of
production considerably more expensive for certain
participants of the SME sector, and thus it may even render
the performance of normal business functions impossible.
As for corporate investments, fewer borrowing opportunities
combined with deteriorating international prospects and
poor internal demand portend fairly weak corporate
investment activity, which should generally trend lower. This
can only be partially offset by the regrouping of EU funds
(the SME package of the government) and by other one-off
factors, such as the large auto industry investment project to
be implemented in the city of Kecskemét. On the whole, we
expect a slight increase in national economic investments
across our forecast horizon in the optimistic scenario. Our
pessimistic outlook, however, indicates a decline not only in
2009, but in 2010 as well.
With respect to the response of households to the tightening
of credit conditions, we should be prepared for a strong
reaction, as households had largely relied on borrowing –
mostly foreign exchange loans in recent years – both for their
consumption and investments. According to the first
scenario, lending will decelerate only gradually until it
reaches its expected sustainable value by the end of 2009.
Based on the average of the years (2000-2001) preceding the
positive shocks (state subsidised housing loans, foreign
currency abundance), we defined this value as 4 per cent of
disposable income. In this scenario, households’ investment
and consumption propensity will decrease only gradually. In
the second scenario, however, we assume a drastic fall in
short-term lending and expect net household borrowings to
be practically at zero for half a year, after which borrowing
can start a long-term gradual recovery process from this level.
In this case, the household investment rate may plunge
drastically, dropping close to the rates that characterised the
first half of the 1990s, and we expect a stronger adjustment
in the sector’s propensity to consume as well. Households
will partly adjust to the decline of net borrowings by reducing
their available funds, but on the whole we expect to see
evidence of a more cautious attitude in the behaviour of the
sector. As a result, we project growth in net financial savings
in both scenarios.
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* Proportionate to disposable income, per cent.
2007 2008 2009 2010
Consumption rate 89.7 89.6-89.7 88.0-89.1 87.1-88.1
Investment rate 7.4 7.2-7.3 5.2-6.6 5.1-6.3
Financial saving rate 2.9 3.1 4.3-6.9 5.6-7.8
Table 3-3
Household consumption and savings rate*
According to our forecast, following this year’s growth rate
of under 1 per cent, the disposable income of households
may decline again in 2009, similar to 2006 and 2007, and
will only start to pick up again in 2010, with a growth rate of
1.3-1.8 per cent. This decline in income can be attributed
partly to government measures and partly to the
deteriorating economic environment.
Following a slight increase in consumption in 2008, we
expect a relapse in consumption next year, and project
only minimal growth in 2010 as well. Consumption will
decline, similar to 2007, by 1-3 per cent next year. Both
scenarios forecast a modest recovery in 2010. Considering
that the rate of borrowing is higher in the financing of
housing investments than in consumption, the contraction
in lending will result in a bigger downturn in household
investment than in household consumption. Even in the
optimistic scenario, due to the combined effect of
deteriorating and increasingly uncertain income prospects
and the drying up of borrowing opportunities, housing
investment is expected to fall by more than 10 per cent
next year.
INFLATION AND REAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 2008 35
2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual August November August November August November
Household consumption expenditure 0.7 0.6 0.4-0.5 1.5 (-3.6)-(-1.1) 2.7 0.4-1.2
Social transfers in kind  -10.8 -0.9 1.3 0.7 0.8 3.2 0.9
Final consumption of households -1.8 0.3 0.5-0.6 1.3 (-2.7)-(-0.7) 2.8 0.5-1.1
Final consumption of government -2.2 -3.1 -1.7 0.9 -1.8 2.0 0.6
Total consumption -1.8 -0.1 0.4-0.5 1.3 (-2.6)-(-0.9) 2.7 0.5-1.0
Gross fixed capital formation 1.5 2.1 (-0.9)-(-0.5) 5.4 (-3.5)-1.1 6.3 (-0.2)-2.8
Changes in inventories
Gross capital formation 1.6 4.7 3.3-3.7 6.2 (-2.9)-1.0 5.5 (-0.8)-1.6
Domestic use -1 1.0 1.2 2.5 (-2.7)-(-0.4) 3.4 0.2-1.2
Export 15.9 10.1 6.2-6.4 7.4 0.0-1.6 8.7 2.0-5.8
Import 13.1 8.8 6.6-6.7 7.4 (-1.2)-1.5 8.9 1.8-4.9
GDP 1.1 2.2 1.0-1.1 2.6 (-1.7)-(-0.2) 3.4 0.5-2.0
Table 3-4
Details of the GDP forecast
Developments on the labour market will also be determined
by the effects of the subdued economic growth in the next
two years. According to our forecast, the corporate sector
will be forced to make significant adjustments as the
profitability of the corporate sector was in a weak position
from the start: profits realised from labour have been
declining for two years. The key issue is how flexible wages
will be under the conditions of sustained weak economic
growth. Based on our experience from the past years, wage
dynamics do not tend to slow significantly in the private
sector even in periods of substantial layoffs, and thus, looking
ahead, the sector faces a great deal of uncertainty as to the
relative importance of the wage channel and that of staff
numbers during the adjustment.
We forecast a substantial wave of layoffs in the private sector
by 2010; even the optimistic scenario predicts that in the
period 2009-2010 over 60,000 employees may be made
redundant in the private sector, while according to our
pessimistic scenario the number of layoffs may exceed
100,000 employees by 2010.
In parallel with the job cuts, nominal wage dynamics may also
sink to historical lows in the private sector. However, in light
of our past observations of wage rigidity, we do not expect a
drastic plunge in wage dynamics at this time, either. In fact,
for next year, we project a wage increase below 6 per cent in
both scenarios. In the first scenario, wage dynamics may drop
to 5-6 per cent by 2010, while the second scenario projects
wage growth near 4 per cent.
12
A common feature in both
scenarios is the expected growth of real wages in the private
sector across the entire forecast horizon, considering that
inflation may decrease significantly.
The question arises as to the possible effect of the public
sector wage cuts on private sector wages, as these cuts are
expected to result in a nearly 8 per cent reduction in real
wages next year. In order to answer this question, in addition
to existing wage rigidities, we should examine the long-term
relationship between private and public sector wages. Wages
in the two sectors may have a measurable, mutual impact on
one another if the employees in the two sectors are close
substitutes. In this case, however, it is the proportion of
wages in the private and public sector which establishes the
connection between private and public employees. If private
sector wages are persistently higher than public sector wages,
it will trigger a labour flow from the public to the private
sector, which will reduce the rate. The reverse will be true if
our starting point is the opposite.
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3.2  Substantial layoffs and decelerating wage
dynamics
Chart 3-3
Components of unit labour costs in the private
sector*
* The edges of the illustrated bands indicate the two scenarios.
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Chart 3-4
The ratio of private to public sector wages*
* Ratio of HUF levels in per cent.
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12 In addition to the wage dynamics of individual employees, the national economic wage growth rate indicated in the CSO statistics includes changes in the
composition of employees as well. As the weight of low-wage jobs is on the decline, looking ahead, this latter effect should be around 1 per cent in the wage index,
according to our calculations derived from past years' processes. This means that the wage growth rate of average employees will fall behind the wage dynamics
indicated in the statistics by 1 percentage point over our entire forecast horizon.
However, as the chart below illustrates, looking back over a
longer period of time in the wake of the government
measures staged for 2009, the ratio of private and public
wages will return to a level, observable before the substantial
wage increases in 2002.
13
Consequently, we did not expect a
very close relationship between the wage dynamics of the two
sectors over our forecast horizon.
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13 It is important to note however, that the question is more complex than the illustration above, as the simple ratio of average wages does not control for changes in
the quality of labor.
According to our calculations, strong disinflation can be
expected over the entire forecast horizon in both scenarios,
provided that our basic assumptions hold true. As opposed to
our previous projections, we now project that inflation will
approach the medium-term target as early as next year, and
for 2010 we expect a further decline in inflation, with the
consumer price index then expected to be around 2 per cent.
Changes in our basic assumptions and deteriorating
macroeconomic prospects have both had a significant impact
on our inflation outlook. Since our August forecast the
EUR/HUF exchange rate and oil prices have changed
significantly, with great volatility. In parallel with exchange
rate depreciation of over 10 per cent which is applied in our
forecast, oil prices have plummeted and global inflation risks
substantially decreased. The net effect of the two processes
on the inflation path is nearly neutral; however, over a longer
time horizon they put slight upward pressure on inflation.
Unfavourable domestic economic processes primarily impact
core inflation in respect of the consumption basket. In our
forecasts published in recent quarters, we have focused
particularly on the disinflationary effect of the negative
output gap. As a result of deteriorating economic prospects
and lower household real income, this disinflationary effect
has become even stronger in our current forecast. Despite the
risks stemming from persistently high inflation expectations,
we now project such a wide output gap that by 2010 it may
result in a decrease of core inflation by 3.5-4 per cent
compared to 2008 – provided that our basic assumptions
hold true. Therefore, in 2010 inflation may actually drop to
below 3 per cent, the level of price stability.
Over a shorter-term perspective, global inflation processes
will play a decisive role in the expected decline of inflation.
On the one hand, decreasing energy and unprocessed food
prices mitigate cost-side price pressures on core inflation
items; on the other hand, these effects are also directly
reflected in product groups outside of core inflation.
The latter effect is confirmed by the fact that relative to our
August forecast, our projections for 2009 show a significant
narrowing of the gap between CPI and core inflation.
Commodity and food prices, which were rising continuously
in the first half of the year, started to fall sharply due to the
deteriorating global economic prospects, which in addition to
decreasing energy prices also led to a decrease in the prices of
domestic unprocessed foods. Looking ahead, lower oil prices
will significantly dampen the growth rate of regulated prices
(gas prices, district heat supply).
14
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3.3  Strong disinflation: inflation is expected to
be nearly on target in 2009 and below target in
2010
Chart 3-5
Projection range for changes in core inflation*
* Year-on-year indices in per cent. The edges of the illustrated bands
indicate the two scenarios.
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Chart 3-6
Projection range for changes in the consumer price
index*
* Year-on-year indices in per cent. The edges of the illustrated bands
indicate the two scenarios.
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14 Since the increase in natural gas prices in 2008 was significantly lower than the growth of import prices, we expect another price increase at the beginning of 2009.
However, according to our basic assumptions the price of imported natural gas may decline in the second half of next year, which will allow a reduction of consumers
gas prices to the end-of-year level of 2008.
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2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Projection
August Current August Current August Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 6.0 5.1 5.2 2.8 2.7 - 3.0 2.7 1.3 - 1.8
Consumer price index 8.0 6.3 6.2 4.1 3.1 - 3.4 3.0 1.5 - 1.9
Economic growth*
External demand (GDP-based) 3.8 2.5 2.1 1.9 (-0.4) - 0.3 2.1 (-0.2) - 1.5
Impact of fiscal demand2 -3.7 -1.5 -1.8 -0.1 (-0.6) - (-0.1) -0.8 (-0.5) - 0.3
Household consumer expenditure 0.7 0.3 0.4 - 0.5 1.4 (-3.6) - (-1.1) 2.8 0.4 - 1.2
Fixed capital formation 1.5 2.1 (-0.9) - (-0.5) 5.4 (-3.5) - 1.1 6.3 (-0.2) - 2.8
Domestic absorption -1.0 1.0 1.2 2.5 (-2.7) - (-0.4) 3.4 0.2 - 1.2
Export 15.9 10.1 6.2 - 6.4 7.4 0.0 - 1.6 8.7 2.0 - 5.8
Import 13.1 8.8 6.6 - 6.7 7.5 (-1.2) - 1.5 8.9 1.8 - 4.9
GDP** 1.1 2.2 1.0 - 1.1 2.6 (-1.7) -(- 0.2) 3.4 0.5 - 2.0
Current account deficit3
As a percentage of GDP 6.4 - 7.0 - 7.2 - 4.0 - 4.9 - 4.3 - 4.4
EUR billions 6.5 - 7.7 - 7.8 - 4.3 - 5.4 - 4.8 - 4.9
External financing requirement3
As a percentage of GDP 5.3 - 5.7 - 5.8 - 1.8 - 2.8 - 1.7 - 1.8
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.0 8.8 8.7 6.5 0.9 - 1.4 6.5 4.4 - 5.6
Whole-economy employment5 -0.1 -1.6 -1.2 -0.6 (-1.3) - (-0.9) 0.1 (-1.8) - (-0.8)
Private sector gross average earnings6 9.1 (8.2) 10.2 (8.5) 9.3 (8.5) 7.2 5.0 - 5.7 6.5 4.3 - 5.5
Private sector employment5 0.9 -1.7 -1.1 -0.7 (-1.4) - (-0.9) 0.2 (-2.2) - (-1.0)
Private sector unit labour cost5, 7 7.3 3.7 4.6 4.1 4.7 3.1 2.0 - 2.8
Household real income*** -3.0 1.3 0.5 - 0.7 2.0 (-0.6) - (-1.8) 2.7 1.3 - 1.8
Table 3-5
Changes in our forecast compared to August
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the long term, however, it follows a similar
trend.
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value represents a narrowing of aggregate demand.
3
For the 2004-2007 period due to the high level of Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) the current account deficit/external financing requirement may be
higher than suggested by official figures.
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
5
According to the CSO LFS data.
6
According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
7
Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
* For October the CSO published annual national accounts data under its regular yearly revision. Annual actual data already reflect the revised values,
however, since their quarterly development is not known at this time, we used earlier data for these purposes of our forecast.
** The table contains data excluding calendar effects.
*** MNB estimate.
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2007 2008 2009 2010
Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, per cent)
MNB (November 2008) 8.0 6.2 3.1 - 3.4 1.5 - 1.9
Consensus Economics (October 2008)1 - 6.2 - 6.3 - 6.6 3.1 - 3.9 - 4.8 -
OECD (June 2008) 8.0 6.3 3.7 -
European Commission (Autumn 2008) 7.9 6.3 3.9 2.9
IMF (November 2008)* 7.9 6.3 4.5 4.1
Reuters-survey (October 2008)1 - 6.2 - 6.3 - 6.3 3.1 - 3.8 - 4.8 2.3 - 2.9 - 3.3
GDP (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (November 2008) 1.1 1.0 - 1.1 (-1.7) - (-0.2) 0.5 - 2.0
Consensus Economics (October 2008)1 - 1.7 - 1.9 - 2.5 1.0 - 1.6 - 2.6 -
OECD (June 2008) 1.3 2.0 3.1 -
European Commission (Autumn 2008) 1.1 1.7 0.7 1.8
IMF (November 2008)* 1.1 1.8 -1.0 0.6
Reuters-survey (October 2008)1 - 1.7 - 2.0 - 2.7 0.8 - 1.2 - 1.5 -
Current account deficit (per cent of GDP)
MNB (November 2008) 6.4 7.0 - 7.2 4.0 - 4.9 4.3 - 4.4
OECD (June 2008) 5.0 4.4 4.1 -
European Commission (Autumn 2008) 6.4 6.3 5.1 5.5
IMF (November 2008)* 6.4 6.2 2.0 1.5
Budget Deficit (ESA-95 method, per cent of GDP)
MNB (November 2008) 5.0 2.9 2.2 - 2.7 2.3 - 3.1
Consensus Economics (October 2008)1 - 3.3 - 3.6 - 4.3 2.9 - 3.3 - 4.5 -
OECD (June 2008) 5.5 4.1 3.5 -
European Commission (Autumn 2008) 5.0 3.4 3.3 3.3
IMF (November 2008)* 4.9 3.4 2.5 2.0
Reuters-survey (October 2008)1 - 3.4 - 3.5 - 3.6 2.9 - 3.1 - 3.5 -
Forecasts on the size of Hungary's export markets (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (November 2008) 8.2 5.3 (-1.4) - 0.4 0.1 - 3.1
OECD (June 2008)2. 3 5.8 6.0 5.9 -
European Commission (Autumn 2008)2 7.2 4.5 2.1 3.9
IMF (October 2008)2 6.4 3.3 0.8 -
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary's trade partners (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (November 2008) 3.8 2.1 (-0.4) - 0.3 (-0.2) - 1.5
OECD (June 2008)2. 3 3.5 2.5 2.0 -
European Commission (Autumn 2008)2 3.6 2.5 0.9 1.7
IMF (October 2008)2 3.6 2.6 1.1 2.2
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of euro area (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (November 2008) 2.7 1.2 (-0.8) - (-0.2) (-0.6) - 1.1
OECD (June 2008) 2.6 1.7 1.4 -
European Commission (Autumn 2008) 2.7 1.2 0.1 0.9
IMF (October 2008) 2.6 1.3 0.2 1.3
Table 3-6
MNB forecast compared to other institutions
The projections of the MNB are ‘conditional’, which means that they cannot always be directly compared with the projections of other institutions.
1
For Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys, in addition to the average value of the analysed replies (i.e. the median value), we also indicate the
lowest and the highest values to illustrate the distribution of the data. 
2
Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of these institutions for the relevant
countries are adjusted with the weighting system of the MNB, which is also used for the calculation of the bank’s own external demand indices. Therefore,
these figures may deviate from the figures published by the specified institutions. 
3
Since OECD did not publish any data on Romania, our OECD forecast
excludes Romania.
* The figures refer to the IMF Staff Report for Hungary, published in November 2008.
Sources: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. (London), October 2008); European Commission Economic Forecasts
(Autumn 2008); IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2008); Reuters survey (October 2008); OECD Economic Outlook (June 2008).
4  State budget and external balance

The fiscal consolidation which started in 2006 has continued
in 2008. As a result, the general government deficit is set to
decline by more than 6 per cent of GDP in two years;
consequently Hungary may already meet the Maastricht
criterion regarding the deficit this year. Despite the
unfavourable macroeconomic changes, in 2009 the decline in
the deficit may continue at an even faster pace than the one
specified in the convergence path, due to tightening on the
expenditure side, which strongly offsets lost revenues.
According to our forecast the modified 2.6 per cent deficit
target set by the government for 2009 can be achieved.
However, without further measures, the declining trend in
the deficit is expected to come to a halt in 2010.
With regard to fiscal policy, positive developments similar to
the ones in 2007 occurred in the first three quarters of 2008.
As a result of slightly higher revenues compared to the budget
plan and keeping expenditures under tight control, the deficit
is expected to be considerably lower than the value indicated
in the convergence programme.
However, based on the major deterioration in
macroeconomic prospects resulting from the credit market
crisis, we expect much lower revenues at end-2008, to which
fiscal policy is trying to adjust by reducing the expenditure
side. The deterioration in international investment sentiment
and the difficulties in budget funding have forced the
Hungarian government to improve the fiscal balance in 2008
and 2009 to an even greater extent than it had planned
previously. Our calculations suggest that the budget deficit
may reach 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2008, which is well below
not only the original 4 per cent target of the convergence
programme, but also the government’s latest 3.4 per cent
forecast. In 2009, the deficit may decline to 2.2-2.7 per cent
of GDP. The measures announced this autumn are still
insufficient to assure a continued decline in the deficit after
2009, and thus the 0.5 percentage point structural
approximation to the medium-term fiscal objective required
by the Stability and Growth Pact.
In contrast to other European countries, which have already
reached or are closer to a balanced fiscal position, stimulating
growth by increasing the budget deficit is not a realistic
option for Hungary in the current situation. Moreover, in the
decelerating phase of the economic cycle, fiscal policy and
implementing further cuts in expenditures while revenues are
declining will have a strongly procyclical effect in 2009 and
2010. Following the earlier declining, but still positive values,
the cyclical component of the budget balance will turn
negative from 2009, i.e. the cyclically adjusted deficit will be
lower than the official ESA deficit.
15
In the first scenario,
budget deficit is to decline by 0.6 percentage point between
2008 and 2010, although the cyclically adjusted balance,
which also takes account of the deteriorating economic
growth, shows an even more significant improvement of 1.3
percentage points. The difference is even more evident in the
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4.1  Changes in state budget deficit indicators
I. scenario II. scenario
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
I. Cash flow balance (GFS) -9.3 -5.5 -3.5 -2.5 -2.7 -3.5 -3.0 -3.5
II. ESA-balance of the general
government -9.3 -5.0 -2.9 -2.2 -2.3 -2.9 -2.7 -3.1
III. Augmented SNA deficit of the general
government -9.6 -5.9 -4.2 -3.9 -3.3 -4.2 -4.3 -4.1
IV. Cyclically adjusted balance of the
general government -2.9 -1.8 -1.7 -3.1 -2.1 -2.1
Table 4-1
Changes in budget deficit indicators
(as a percentage of GDP)
15 The cyclically adjusted deficit is the sum of the official deficit indicator and the cyclical component. If the cyclical component is negative, it means that the increase
in the key tax bases (consumption and wage bill) lags behind its long-term trend, i.e. in this case tax revenues are also below their trend. In the case of a negative
cyclical component, the fiscal deficit is higher than the cyclically adjusted deficit, i.e. when growing along the trend. The change in the cyclical balance shows the real
size of the effect of fiscal policy excluding macroeconomic changes, i.e. it takes into account the automatic changes stemming from macroeconomic developments.
According to another interpretation, the cyclically adjusted balance is nothing else but an indicator of how big the balance would be if tax bases changed in line with
their trend.
second scenario, as in this case the official deficit is expected
to increase slightly between 2008 and 2010, but excluding
the deficit-increasing effect of the deceleration in economic
growth the cyclically adjusted state budget position would
show a 1.0 percentage point decline.
The effect of the automatic stabilisers in the budget is
illustrated in Chart 1. Between 1996 and 2001, fiscal policy
reduced the deficit in a way that in the meantime its revenues
lagged behind the trend as a result of the below-trend
increase in determining tax bases (wages and consumption).
By contrast, between 2002 and 2008, as a result of positive
business cycle conditions, revenues temporarily improved the
deficit. From 2009, the main macroeconomic variables
important from a budgetary aspect are expected to grow
below their trend rates again, which will entail that the cycle
will impair the official indicators of the fiscal balance in 2009
and 2010.
SUBSTANTIAL DECLINE IN REVENUES
DUE TO UNFAVOURABLE
MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
The budget deficit for 2008, which is lower than set in the
convergence programme, is mainly the result of higher-than-
expected revenues, the lower expenditures of budgetary
institutions and the freezing of the balance reserves, while
interest expenditures and pension expenditures exceeded the
target. In 2008, in terms of the central budget, approximately
half of the improvement in the balance compared to the
original target results from lower expenditures, while the
other half stems from higher revenues. In 2008, revenues of
the central budget are expected to be HUF 100 billion higher
than the estimate, although looking ahead we expect a
decline in tax revenues.
Compared to both the May and August issues of the Report,
our expectations regarding the increase in the key tax bases
have declined considerably, resulting in a drastic fall in tax
revenues in 2009 and 2010. Compared to 2008, the GDP-
proportionate tax and social security contribution revenues
will fall by around 0.5 percentage point in 2009. Compared
to our earlier assumption, both scenarios examined by us
indicate a significant decline in the gross wage bill and
consumption, which will result in a notable decline in the
main revenue items (personal income tax, social security
contributions, VAT). Compared to the May and August
macroeconomic scenarios, the gross whole-economy wage
bill is expected to fall by approximately 4-5 percentage
points in 2009, and only a slight increase is presumed for
2010 as well. The decline in the wage bill and revenues
originating from it is partly related to the elimination of the
13th month salaries in the government sector. In May and
August, we assumed a nearly 6 per cent increase for the
other key tax base, i.e. nominal household consumption for
2009. Now, we expect that this growth rate will decline to
the vicinity of 2 per cent even under favourable
circumstances. However, in an unfavourable context,
household consumption might even contract by up to 0.5
per cent.
The erosion of VAT revenues related to consumption already
started in 2008 H2, and this adverse trend is expected to
continue next year as well. In the scenario based on less
favourable business conditions (Scenario II), with the relative
similarity of the wage path, a considerable decline in
consumption is expected. Therefore, in 2009 the related
revenues will be below the ones justified by the more
favourable scenario of business conditions (Scenario I). There
is a significant difference between the two scenarios, mainly
in terms of revenues, amounting to approximately 0.5 per
cent of GDP in 2009 and 0.8 per cent in 2010.
EXPENDITURE MEASURES TO OFFSET
LOST REVENUES: A FURTHER
IMPROVING DEFICIT PATH
The three largest and most important items determining the
expenditure side of the budget are the expenditures of the
budgetary chapters and institutions, pension expenditures
and interest expenditures paid on government debt, which
together cover nearly three quarters of the consolidated
expenditures of the state budget.
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Chart 4-1
Cyclical components of the budget according to the
two scenarios
(As a percentage of GDP)*
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In order to offset revenues lost due to the strong
deterioration of the macroeconomic path, the government
has included several new expenditure-side measures in the
Budget Act. In addition to the nominal freezing of public
employees’ wages, the 13th month salary will be eliminated
and there will be significant tightening with regard to the
13th month pensions. Appropriations to budgetary
institutions will be cut considerably, and there will be some
minor measures in the field of certain social benefits. As a
result of the worsening macroeconomic path and the
expenditure-side measures offsetting these effects, the
government amended the deficit target from the originally
planned 3.2 per cent to 2.6 per cent in 2009.
Between 2005 and 2007, expenditures of budgetary
institutions increased sharply, although a major part of the
increase is due to individual developments such as the sudden
rise in the gas price compensation in 2006, spending on
motorway construction or the capital transfer for MÁV
(Hungarian State Railways) in 2007. Excluding these major
individual items, budgetary institutions’ expenditures related
to fundamental developments practically stagnated in
nominal terms in 2008.
16
In the first 10 months of the year,
strict discipline prevailed on the expenditure side of the
budget. As a result, budgetary institutions’ expenditures and
the use of reserves together may be HUF 100 billion below
the estimate in 2008.
Compared to the value expected for 2008, in 2009 the net
expenditure target for budgetary institutions (including
stability reserves) will be nearly HUF 260 billion lower in
nominal terms. Taking into account the approximately HUF
140 billion decline in the already known individual items
(motorway construction and gas price compensation) and the
approximately HUF 100 billion decline in expenditure
resulting from the cancellation of the 13th month salary for
public employees working within the central budget,
regarding the other items this means a stagnation in nominal
terms. This assumption means a strict budget control, similar
to the first three quarters of 2008. Overall, the total
expenditure level will decline by 1.2 per cent of GDP. For
2010 we expect an overall slight nominal increase, which
means a continued decline in proportion to GDP.
As a result of the announced measures and changes in
macroeconomic conditions, pension expenditures as a
proportion of GDP are expected to decline slightly in 2009,
while from 2010 they may again exceed the 2008 level. The
main underlying reason is the rising wage index, which is
expected to offset the impact of the decreasing inflation. In
addition to the automatic effect stemming from the
macroeconomic path, concrete measures were also taken,
primarily aimed at reducing 13th month pension payments.
In 2009, only pensioners above the legal age limit will be
entitled to receive the 13th month old-age pension, with a
cap on the maximum monthly payment at HUF 80,000. The
part of the five-year pension correction programme due next
year will only be implemented from September, in order to
reduce next year’s expenditures. We assume that the
measures affecting the 13th month pension will remain in
force in 2010 as well.
Despite the declining financing requirements, the
significantly rising yield curve will result in an increase in
interest expenditures both in 2009 and 2010. By end-
October, benchmark yields on government bond had
increased markedly at all maturities, i.e. by approximately
300 basis points compared to the summer period, while the
average October yield level was also around 100-200 basis
points above the summer average. As a result of the declining
financing requirement, the changing financing structure and
the rising yield level, interest expenditures are expected to
increase by approximately HUF 60 billion in 2009 compared
to 2008 and using the October average yield curve.
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Chart 4-2
Net expenditures of budgetary institutions
excluding certain individual items
Individual items: costs of motorway constructions, energy compensation
(gas price compensation), MÁV capital transfer (in 2007).
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16 The structure of expenditures of budgetary institutions, however, changed in an extremely heterogeneous manner in 2008: while the purchase of goods and services
increased somewhat faster than inflation, and wage expenditures as well as other transfer-like expenditures practically remained at nominal levels, investment –
excluding the costs of motorway construction – fell by a drastic 40 per cent in the first three quarters of 2008, compared to the same period of 2007.
RISKS SURROUNDING THE FISCAL PATH
On the revenue side, the risks surrounding our forecast
basically relate to the development of macroeconomic
variables, while mainly in the case of budgetary institutions
and interest expenditures on the expenditure side.
In case of the basic processes of budgetary institutions, also
taking account of past dynamics, we perceive significant
risks. Based on these risks, the expenditure level would be
somewhat higher than the target. On the one hand,
purchases of goods and services in recent years always grew
faster than inflation. If we assume maintaining at least the
real value, this would lead to a remarkable nominal
increase. On the other hand, the average growth rate of
investment and other expenditures (e.g. transfers) exceeded
10 per cent between 2002 and 2007, but excluding
individual items as well the average growth was 1 per cent
even in non-election years. Accordingly, in 2009
expenditures would increase by at least 0.2-0.3 per cent of
GDP compared to the basic forecast, even if we take into
account this very moderate path.
Of course, calculating using the historical average of earlier
years, the risks are much more significant. They may even
reach 1 per cent of GDP, although in the current situation –
taking into account the fiscal tightening and the pressures
stemming from the changing of the external environment –
we do not consider this realistic. The appropriations of
budgetary institutions conceal significant risks in 2010 as
well, although the ‘fiscal ceiling’ legislation may contribute to
keeping the expenditures within limits.
In our central forecast, for the projection of the interest
expenditures, we basically took into account the average level
of yields in October. If yields change compared to the average
October increase, that may obviously have an effect on
interest expenditures as well. As a rule of thumb, a 100 basis
point parallel shift in the yield curve, i.e. one which affects all
maturity segments, moves the government’s interest
expenditures by 0.15 per cent of GDP on average in the first
year. The debt management agency can obviously react to the
change in the yield by changing the forint/foreign exchange
ratio or by changing the financing structure of forint debt
(changing the average maturity of debt), which all influence
the magnitude of interest expenditures. Moreover, it is
important to mention, that the higher proportion of the
foreign exchange financing leads to lower interest
expenditures of the budget on the one hand, but on the other
hand it could cause losses in the central bank due to the
increase of the sterilisation costs, which can result in higher
budget expenditures later.
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Historical average 2008 Q1-Q3 Expected 2009
2002–2007
1. Wage bill 9.9% 2.2% -7.5%
2. Purchase of goods and services 10.2% 8.4%
0%
3. Investments and other expenditure without special items 7.7% -8.9%
Table 4-2
Nominal growth rates of expenditure items of budgetary institutions in various comparisons
According to preliminary data, the combined current and
capital account balance, i.e. the external financing
requirement was around 4.2 per cent of GDP in 2008 H1,
which roughly corresponds to the end-2007 level.
17
The fact
that the improvement in external equilibrium came to a halt
is mainly attributable to the changes in external economic
conditions. As a result of the weakening external economic
activity, the improvement in the trade balance did not
continue in H1, although foreign trade transactions still
reduced the current account deficit considerably. At the same
time, the deficit of the income balance increased slightly as a
result of an increase in net interest expenditures, presumably
due to the increased costs of external funding. In H1, EU
transfers worth approximately EUR 850 million were
received by Hungary, which contributed to a reduction of the
external imbalance.
Besides the external financing requirement remaining at an
unchanged level, there was no important change in the
financing situation of domestic sectors in 2008 H1 either.
Although the financing requirement of the consolidated
general government continued to decline, following the
drastic adjustment in previous years, the decline in the deficit
decelerated. At the same time, the decline in fiscal imbalance
was mainly offset by the declining net savings of households,
which in H1 took place simultaneously with still intensive
borrowing. Corporations’ financing requirement remained
practically unchanged.
Our external equilibrium forecast has been compiled
according to the two scenarios presented in the real economy
chapter. The macroeconomic assumptions are completely
identical with the ones described therein, but the scenario
containing drastic credit slowdown has also been completed
with external funding costs remaining permanently at high
level. This leads to an increase in the external financing
requirement through the increase in debt burdens, as all
domestic sectors are able to finance consumption or
investment over their income only at a higher cost. With the
assumptions of the two scenarios, there may be considerable
differences in the developments in the financing capacity of
domestic sectors on the whole forecast horizon, but as a
result of opposing effects, external financing requirement
differs significantly only in 2009.
Compared to the previous year, the GDP-proportionate
external financing requirement in 2008 may slightly increase,
and it can reach 5.7 per cent. Although we expect a sharp
decline in households’ borrowing and thus an increase in net
savings in the last moths of the year, data available for Q3
have not indicated the start of the adjustment process yet.
Consequently, the financing capacity of households may fall
short of the level in 2007. The SNA deficit of the
consolidated general government may stabilise at around 4
per cent of GDP, which also means a significant, nearly 2
percentage point improvement compared to the previous
year. However, the considerable narrowing of sales
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4.2  External balance
Chart 4-3
Changes in the financing capacity of individual
sectors*
* Adjusted by the difference caused by imports brought forward on account
of EU accession and by the import increasing impact generated by customs
warehouses terminated due to EU accession and by the Gripen purchases.
** The financing capacity of the corporate sector is determined as a
residual item, therefore, it contains the errors of other statistics as well.
*** In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government
includes local governments, the ÁPV Ltd., institutions discharging quasi-
fiscal duties (Hungarian State Railways [MÁV], Budapest Transport
Company [BKV]), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects
initiated and controlled by the government and formally implemented
under PPP schemes.
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17 In September 2008, the MNB and the CSO made significant revisions in several points of the Balance of Payments data going back to 2004. Overall, the revisions
increased the official GDP-proportionate external financing requirement (calculated "from above") by approximately 1-1.5 percentage points. The external
financing requirement calculated "from below" did not change significantly, thus the value of 'Errors and Omissions' declined considerably. Despite the remarkable
difference in levels, the dynamics of the time series hardly changed. Consequently, our assessment of previous years' improving external balance situation did not
change either.
opportunities – mainly the economic recession experienced
in export markets – may significantly reduce the profitability
of corporations, which may result in a major increase in the
sector’s financing requirement even against the background
of slack investment activity. Consequently, as a result of the
deteriorating macroeconomic environment, the external
imbalance may increase despite the significant fiscal
adjustment.
For 2009, we project a considerable improvement in the
external equilibrium situation in both scenarios. The gradual
narrowing of borrowing in the first scenario results in a fall in
consumption and restrained investment dynamics, which may
lead to an increase in the financing capacity of households
and corporations. With regard to the structure of the Balance
of Payments, this may appear in an increase of the surplus of
the trade balance, which is mainly attributable to the
considerable fall in import demand.
In the second scenario, drastic credit tightening causes a
strong decline in consumption and investment,
simultaneously with a permanent recession in our export
markets as well. On the one hand, the decline in borrowing
justifies a sudden increase in the savings of the household
sector. However, corporations’ financing position may also
deteriorate as a result of the permanent European recession,
and due to a decline in determining tax bases (consumption,
corporate profit) the state budget deficit may also increase.
18
Overall, however, this scenario may result in an even more
significant decline in the external financing requirement.
From the real economy side, a major part of the
improvement in the external equilibrium may be reflected in
an improvement of the trade balance as well. 
According to the assumptions of the first scenario, the
improvement in the external equilibrium may continue in
2010, while in the second scenario the decline in external
deficit may stop. In the first case, the gradually declining
borrowing reaches the long-term equilibrium value by early
2010, while exports may benefit from the external demand,
which is becoming slightly more dynamic. In the second
scenario, net borrowing, following a drastic fall, will also
increase to its equilibrium level by 2010, but our export
markets will face permanent recession, thus the surplus of the
real economy balance may decrease. In this scenario, in
addition to the permanent fall in external demand, the
increase in the costs of external financing also points to an
increase in the external financing requirement.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Estimate First scenario Second scenario
I. Consolidated general goverment* -9.4 -9.6 -5.9 -4.1 -3.8 -3.3 -4.1 -4.3 -4.1
II. Households 4.4 3.4 1.7 0.7 2.9 3.9 1.0 5.5 4.5
Corporate sector and "error" (= A - I.- II. ) -1.7 -0.7 -1.1 -2.3 -1.9 -2.3 -2.7 -3.0 -2.2
A) External financing capacity. "from above"(=B+C )** -6.7 -6.9 -5.3 -5.7 -2.8 -1.7 -5.8 -1.8 -1.8
B) Current account balance** -7.5 -7.5 -6.4 -7.0 -4.9 -4.3 -7.2 -4.0 -4.4
– in EUR billions ** -6.7 -6.8 -6.5 -7.7 -5.4 -4.9 -7.8 -4.3 -4.8
C) Capital account balance 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.4 2.1 2.6 1.4 2.1 2.6
D) Net errors and omissions (NEO)*** -1.8 -2.3 -1.6 -3.0 -2.4 -2.3 -3.0 -2.4 -2.4
External financing capacity "from below" (=A+D) -8.5 -9.3 -6.9 -8.7 -5.2 -4.0 -8.8 -4.2 -4.2
Table 4-3
GDP-proportionate net financing capacity of individual sectors
* In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government includes local governments, the ÁPV Ltd., institutions discharging quasi-fiscal
duties (MÁV, BKV), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by the government and formally implemented under
PPP schemes.
** During the 2004-2007 period, due to the high level of Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) the current account deficit/external financing requirement
may be higher than suggested by official figures.
*** In our forecast for the ‘errors and omissions’ item of the balance of payments we assumed that the cumulated figure for the last four quarters will
remain unchanged.
18 The ESA deficit – as it was described in the fiscal chapter- may decline in both scenarios in 2009. However, the 2009 SNA deficit of the consolidated general
government is increased significantly by the costs of the M6 motorway, which is being built according to the PPP scheme. This may even cause a deterioration of the
SNA balance in the second scenario.
FINANCING THE CURRENT ACCOUNT
DEFICIT
In 2008 H1, the ‘bottom-up’ external financing requirement
amounted to EUR 4.6 billion, which corresponds to 7.4 per
cent of GDP, taking seasonal effects into account.
19
Compared to 2007, the structure of financing of the balance
of payments changed in a favourable direction from
investors’ perspective, as following the previous year’s
outflow of non-debt creating funds, one-third of net external
borrowing was financed by non-debt items in 2008 H1. The
increase in non-debt creating financing is mainly attributable
to the strong FDI inflow and the partial selling of MOL’s
own shares bought up earlier, while institutional investors’
purchases of foreign shares again resulted in significant
capital outflows.
The tensions of external financing experienced in recent
months only slightly affected the financing side of the
Balance of Payments in 2008 H1. The role of short-term debt
increased in external funding, and the structure of gross
external debt at remaining maturity also shifted in the
direction of shorter maturities. The banking sector’s short
term borrowing as well as the shortening of credit
institutions’ and corporations’ longer-term credits played a
decisive role in the increase of external debt maturing within
one year. However, it is important to note that the narrowing
of liquidity experienced in international financial markets
resulted in an increase in short-term external debt in most
countries of the region.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Fact/Preliminary fact First scenario Second scenario
1. Balance of goods and services* -1.2 -0.9 1.4 1.3 3.1 3.8 1.2 4.1 3.9
2. Income balance -5.6 -6.2 -7.3 -7.7 -7.4 -7.4 -7.7 -7.4 -7.7
3. Balance of current transfers -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6
I. Current account balance (1+2+3) * -7.5 -7.5 -6.4 -7.0 -4.9 -4.3 -7.2 -4.0 -4.4
Current account balance in EUR billions * -6.7 -6.8 -6.5 -7.7 -5.4 -4.9 -7.8 -4.3 -4.8
II. Capital account balance 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.4 2.1 2.5 1.4 2.1 2.6
External financing capacity (I+II) * -6.7 -6.9 -5.3 -5.7 -2.8 -1.7 -5.8 -1.8 -1.8
Table 4-4
Structure of the GDP-proportionate current account
(relative to GDP, per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
* During the 2004-2007 period, due to the high level of Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) the current account deficit/external financing requirement
may be higher than suggested by official figures.
19 Although as a result of the revision Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) declined significantly for 2004-2007, its value increased again in 2008 H1, amounting to
approximately EUR 2 billion. Consequently, the financing requirement calculated from below continues to significantly exceed the official indicator.
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